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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Respondent concurs in the jurisdictional statement of the 
Appellant in the Appellant's brief. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The STATEMENT OF FACTS have been arranged in such a way as to 
follow the outline of the FINDINGS OF FACT since the FINDINGS OF 
FACT has been brought into question.1 The Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law are attached as Addendum #5. 
RON HORTON is a musician. He received his music degree in 
violin performance at the University of Utah. At the time of the 
trial he was had been a member of the Utah Symphony, Music Director 
at Ballet West, and Music Director of the National Symphony 
Orchestra of Ecuador. In addition he did recordings with the 
Tabernacle Choir. Transcript at 25-26, 33. 
FINDING NO. 1; RON HORTON had an auto accident in December 
1983 and suffered injuries. The pain from the auto accident was 
such that it brought his consulting career to a halt. Transcript 
at 26, 33 & 34. 
The following abbreviations are used through-
out: The Record on Appeal, as paginated by the 
Third District Court Clerk, is designated "R"; 
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
entered by the Lower Court on March 6, 1989, 
are designated "Findings" or "Conclusions"; the 
trial exhibits are designated as "Exhibit "; 
transcript pages will be cited as "Transcript 
at ". 
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FINDING NO. 2: In September of 1984 after the accident, Mr. 
HORTON took a position teaching violin at the violin making school 
Peter Paul Prier which was a modest position for him, but all he 
could handle because of the health problems that lingered from the 
auto accident. He was employed on a normal school year from 
September to June and was on a monthly salary of $850 per month. 
He was not asked to keep track of his hours nor did anyone else at 
his employer's keep track of his hours. He was to teach violin to 
the students and take whatever time was needed. He was paid as a 
full-time employee. He calculated he worked 28-1/2 hours per 
month. Transcript at 35-38, 51, 55, 98, Addendum 3. 
FINDING NO. 3; RON HORTON signed up for group health and life 
insurance with the Defendant on November 1, 1984. Transcript at 
40. RON HORTON told the agent for GEM STATE who sold the policy 
to Peter Paul Prier, when he signed up, that he had been injured 
in a previous accident and he needed future physical therapy and 
medical treatment. He was reassured that he would be covered after 
the 9-month waiting period had expired. Transcript at 51. Mr. 
HORTON indicated to the agent his duties and that he was working 
on a school year basis and paid a monthly salary. Transcript at 
41. 
RON HORTON did not ever see the booklet Inter-mountain 
Employers Trust Cost Savers Flex-Med Comprehensive Major Medical 
Benefit Description booklet. (Exhibit 35) Transcript at 41. 
Mr. HORTON entered the Pain Clinic at the University of Utah 
Medical Center on February 16, 1986. The Pain Clinic contacted the 
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Defendant GEM STATE and obtained pre-authorization to admit RON 
HORTON and received a letter from GEM STATE authorizing payment for 
50 percent of the Pain Clinic's bills for RON HORTON. Transcript 
at 58/ 60/ 66; Addendum 1. His attending physician said Mr. HORTON 
was a 1 on a scale of 10 (a 10 being normal) and was very seriously 
debilitated from the pain from the accident. Transcript at 64. 
In the Pain Clinic, Mr. HORTON improved dramatically. Transcript 
at 68. His medical bills at the Pain Clinic totalled $13,633.600. 
The portion of which GEM STATE was responsible for was $8,254.80. 
(Statement of Facts of the Defendant GEM STATE #18). 
FINDING NO. 4; Statement of Facts GEM STATE #4. 
FINDING NO. 5: GEM STATE pre-authorized RON HORTON1s 
treatment in the Pain Clinic. Transcript at 60-66. Addendum l. 
On June 3, 1986, GEM STATE reversed itself and told Plaintiff that 
the Pain Clinic expenses were not a covered expense. Addendum 4. 
Shirley Sunderlund who had been with GEM STATE 14 years and 
oversees the claims department was claims manager for GEM STATE in 
1986. She is familiar with Pain Clinic claims. She was aware that 
the letter was sent out pre-authorizing RON HORTON1s claims and did 
not dispute that the letter was a GEM STATE document and was sent 
to the Pain Clinic. She testified that there is no question that 
the letter was sent out saying GEM STATE had pre-authorized the 
expense. Transcript at 368-381, Addendum 1. 
FINDING NO. 6: Addendum 4. 
FINDING NO. 7: Statement of Pacts GEM STATE #8. 
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FINDING NO, 8: On May 14, 1986, Peter Paul Prier wrote to GEM 
STATE advising GEM STATE that RON HORTON was employed and was on 
a monthly salary. Addendum 2. 
FINDING NO. 9: Addendum 3. 
FINDING NO. 10; Statement of Facts GEM STATE #11. 
FINDING NO. 11; Peter Paul Prierfs violin making school was 
two (2) blocks from GEM STATE'S office in Salt Lake City. 
Transcript at 262, 354. GEM STATE general counsel stated someone 
should have walked over to Peter Paul Prierfs and personally 
inspected the books (Transcript at 456, 477) . GEM STATE had the 
authority in its master policy to inspect the books of Peter Paul 
Prier any time it wanted during normal business hours (Transcript 
at 296). 
FINDING NO. 12; Statement of Facts GEM STATE #3. 
FINDING NO. 13; At no time before the cancellation of the 
insurance by GEM STATE did anyone from GEM STATE ever request of 
RON HORTONfs W-2 form. Transcript at 99. 
Carolyn Ivie an employee of GEM STATE was in charge of 
investigating eligibility of RON HORTON (Transcript at 350)• She 
stated that in the 6 to 7 months GEM STATE took to investigate this 
matter from March 1986 to September 1986 GEM STATE pre-authorized 
the Pain Clinic services, then they denied them. Transcript at 
75-77, Addendum 4. 
RON HORTON had to work 1,000 hours per year to be eligible 
for his policy according to GEM STATE'S master policy that governed 
Peter Paul Prier's health insurance, according to Carolyn Ivie. 
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Transcript at 246-249. The master policy governs the conduct but 
they do not give the master policy to the employees (HORTON) or to 
the employer (Peter Paul Prier). Transcript at 251. She stated 
that many of the policy provisions are left out of the booklets 
that are given to the employer employee, but the trust agreement 
is the bible GEM STATE goes by. Her job was to find out whether 
RON HORTON was eligible according to the master policy. Transcript 
at 97-98, 251-252. 
Mr. Jeff Garbardi, GEM STATE'S general counsel testified that 
the number of hours Mr. HORTON worked was never at issue (unlike 
Carolyn Ivie's testimony heretofore set forth) only whether or not 
he was employed by Peter Paul Prier. Testimony at 456. RON HORTON 
testified that at no time was he ever informed by anyone at GEM 
STATE that the only issue they were concerned about is whether or 
not he was employed by Peter Paul Prier. Transcript at 492, 97-
98. 
On about June 3, 1986, GEM STATE wrote to RON HORTON and told 
him GEM STATE did not cover plain clinics (Addendum 4). 
In September, 1986, seven (7) months after the medical bills 
had been received by GEM STATE, they still wanted evidence that 
HORTON had been working 1,000 hours. Mrs. Ivie testified that she 
did not know if anyone had ever asked Mr. HORTON for evidence that 
he had worked 1,000 hours. Transcript at 332-333. Carolyn Ivie 
could not determine the amount of hours RON HORTON worked by 
looking at his check stubs when she received them. Mrs. Ivie 
herself is a monthly salaried employee and there is nothing on her 
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payroll check indicating how many hours she worked per month. 
Transcript at 272-273. RON HORTONfs eligibility had been misjudged 
by the 1,000 hour rule for seven (7) months. Transcript at 309. 
FINDING NO. 14: Failure to pay his medical bills finally 
began to get Mr. HORTON down. The stress and pain returned after 
the notice of the cancellation of the insurance in September 1986. 
Mr. HORTON returned to the Pain Clinic for treatment. He began 
missing work because of his condition. Transcript at 69/ 78, 103-
104. The Pain Clinic again commenced giving him stellate ganglion 
blocks and trigger point injections. These shots were done with 
long needles and were very painful. These shots were used to 
disrupt the transmission of pain within the body. Transcript at 
110. 
FINDING NO. 15: RON HORTON made every effort to get GEM STATE 
to pay the bill because their failure to pay was slowly causing him 
to regress from his successful treatment at the Pain Clinic and 
thus not be able to get back to conducting. He went to GEM STATE'S 
office or called them at least 6 to 10 times and almost every time 
was told to speak to someone different. Each time he got a 
different response as to what he needed to satisfy GEM STATE. He 
would often leave messages and they would take some considerable 
time in returning his calls. Transcript at 92, 94-96. 
GEM STATE told RON HORTON in mid-summer of 1986, four (4) 
months after the medical bills had been received by GEM STATE, that 
he had to be working 1,000 hours per year. Mr. HORTON told GEM 
STATE he did not have time cards and kept no records of his hours 
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and that he was a monthly salaried employee. He went to Peter Paul 
Prier to see what he could do to get the matter resolved. Mr. 
HORTON was never reluctant to turn over any thing that he could 
think of to be helpful to GEM STATE since he wanted to get these 
bills paid. Transcript at 97-98. 
Mr. HORTON has never run a business and is not familiar with 
business records. Peter Paul Prier made his employee pay checks 
out by hand and was very unsophisticated in his business practices. 
Peter Paul Prier was not computerized and there was no stub on the 
paycheck. Transcript at 100-101. 
RON HORTON asked Peter Paul Prier to send payroll records, 
Mr. Prier responded that he had sent them two (2) letters. 
Addendum 1 & 2. GEM STATE specializes in small unsophisticated 
businesses. GEM STATE did not, at any time, tell Peter Paul Prier 
why his two (2) letters (Addendum 1 & 2) were unacceptable. 
Transcript at 268-269. 
GEM STATE'S general counsel testified he thought he should 
have walked over (2 blocks away) to Peter Paul Prier's office 
personally and talk to Mr. Prier in light of what he has learned. 
He also testified that he likely should have asked Mr. HORTON for 
his W-2 forms. Transcript at 477, 456, 262, 296. 
The contract between Peter Paul Prier and GEM STATE allows GEM 
STATE to go to Peter Paul Prier fs at any time during working hours 
and inspect their payroll records. Transcript at 29 6. 
Mrs. Ivie testified that GEM STATE did not complete their 
investigation in 45-days. Transcript at 540. She testified that 
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RON HORTON should have been notified within twenty (20) days of the 
acceptance or denial of his claim. GEM STATE is bound by the State 
Regulations regulating the handling of insurance claims (These are 
set forth hereinafter). Transcript at 322-323. 
Mr. HORTON reckoned he worked an average of 28-1/2 hours per 
week with some weeks more and some weeks less. Transcript at 98# 
Addendum 3. 
FINDING NO. 17; 17(d) Mr. HORTONfs professional standing has 
been adversely impacted by his absence from conducting in the world 
of music. Gerald Ottley, conductor of the Tabernacle Choir 
testified that in the music world it takes a long apprenticeship. 
Both a performer and a conductor must make themselves visible and 
keep themselves visible if they are going to retain employment. 
Potential employment opportunities always asked what have you done 
lately? Transcript at 224-225. Mr. HORTON is a particularly 
skilled conductor of ballet. He understands ballet and he 
understands the music of ballet. Had this incident not occurred, 
he would have been very well-established nation-wide as a conductor 
making a substantial living. Transcript at 222-223. Gerald Ottley 
considers RON HORTON was underemployed, at Peter Paul Prier's. 
Transcript at 227. 
Harold Lundstrom, Music Critic of the Deseret News for 20 
years, rated RON HORTON by all odds the very best conductor of 
Ballet West has ever had and the best ballet conductor he has ever 
seen in Utah. Mr. Lundstrom was on the ballet board and the opera 
board. Transcript at 227-234. He stated that in 1983, he was tops 
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among the young conductors in the west. It is one thing to be out 
of conducting for 3 years, but to be out of conducting for 5 years 
Mr. Lundstrom indicated you almost have to start from scratch. 
Transcript at 236-277. Mr. HORTON testified that he had in the 
2-year period while he was having his relapse he had inquiries from 
the Royal Ballet and the Buffalo Philharmonic. There are many lost 
opportunities and opportunities he could have sought had he 
recovered timely. Transcript at 213# 215. Mr. HORTON testified 
that because conducting is a very competitive business they book 
conductors way in advance. I could not commit myself because of 
my declining health problems as a result of my unpaid bills. 
Transcript at 216, 197-200. 
ARGUMENT SUMMARY 
It is argued that GEM STATE did not diligently investigate the 
facts or fairly evaluate and consider the information provided them 
by Mr. HORTON and Peter Paul Prier. Nor did they act promptly and 
reasonably in either rejecting or settling the claim. 
GEM STATE failed to stand by the fact that they pre-authorized 
the University of Utah Medical Center's Pain Clinic to pay one-
half (1/2) of the medical bills of RON HORTONfs stay. GEM STATE 
then spent seven (7) months trying to find a way to avoid honoring 
that commitment. Further, the agent who sold the policy to Peter 
Paul Prier confirmed that RON HORTON would be covered after the 
nine (9) month waiting period. 
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It is argued that several of GEM STATE'S employees who dealt 
with RON HORTON had a different eligibility requirement which they 
were holding him to. Some said he needed 1,000 hours per year to 
be a full-time employee, some full-time, and some saying they only 
needed evidence that he was actually employed. 
If it is found by this Court that there are none or only one 
of the many issues raised by GEM STATE in this appeal have merit, 
then RON HORTON asks for his attorney's fees in defending this 
appeal for the issues, if any there be, that are found to be 
frivolous. 
ARGUMENT 
GEM STATE PRE-AUTHORIZED RON HORTON1S BILLS 
It is a well-settled principal of law that 
In accordance with the agency principals, a 
corporation is bound by the knowledge acquired 
by, or notice as given to, its officers or 
agents within actual or apparent scope of 
their authority or employment and in reference 
to the matter to which their authority or 
employment extends. 18B Am.Jur.2d 1671. 
In this case GEM STATE'S employee pre-authorized the Pain 
Clinic's bills for RON HORTON prior to his entering the hospital 
bound GEM STATE (see Addendum 1) . All that occurred for seven (7) 
months thereafter was harassment, plain and simple. Transcript at 
60-66, 368-381. 
In the case of Allstate Insurance Co. v. State Farm Automobile 
Insurance Co., 679 P.2d 879 (Oregon 1983) the Court said, 
An insured may be estopped from denying cover-
age when the party claiming coverage has acted 
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in reasonable reliance on the agent represent-
ation of coverage that is not patently absurd. 
(Citations omitted). 
In the Allstate case, supra, an agent concluded that the 
insurer was entitled to rely on the agent's representation and 
the insurance company was estopped from asserting a contrary 
interpretation of the policy. 
In Nolden v. Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Co., 259 NW.2d 75 
(Wis. 1977) the Court said, 
The physicians had recommended open heart 
surgery. According to Greenwood, Nolden was 
concerned as to whether or not the company 
would pay the benefits of the hospital bills 
that he was going to have if he went on for 
surgery. Greenwood expressed the opinion that 
the company would probably continue to pay as 
it had on several earlier bills. The record 
does not make clear the extent to which the 
heart surgery elective. Greenwood's testimony 
indicates, however, that Nolden had some 
element of choice, if only as to the timing of 
the surgery, and chose to proceed relying on 
the insurance coverage, this was a sufficient 
reliance to estop the company from denying 
coverage. (Id. 83). 
The Utah Supreme Court has found in Microbiological Research 
Corp. v. Muna. 625 P.2d 690 (Utah 1981): 
A corporation, being once charged with notice 
of the character of transaction, continues to 
be affected by such notice, whatever changes 
may occur in the personnel of its working 
force. (Id. 695) 
In Lowe v. April Industries. Inc., 531 P.2d 1297 (Utah 1974) 
the court held, " . . . knowledge of the entity is imputed to it 
from the knowledge possessed by its officers and agents." (Id. 
1299) . 
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It would appear that GEM STATE was therefore estopped from 
denying their pre-authorization and are bound by their pre-
authorization upon which Mr. HORTON and the hospital relied 
(Addendum 1). 
Mark Anderson sold the GEM STATE policy to Peter Paul Prier 
and interviewed RON HORTON. RON HORTON told Mr. Anderson of the 
specifics of his employment and told him about his prior accident 
and his need of future medical treatment. Mr. Anderson assured 
him he would be covered. These facts were never refuted at trial. 
Transcript at 50-51. 
In the case of Hit v. Cox, 737 Fed. Rptr. 2nd 420 (4th Cir., 
Court of Appeals, 1984) it says: 
When an insurance company through its agent, 
undertakes to advise an insured on the scope 
of the insured's coverage, it is reasonable 
per se for the insured to rely on the 
company's representation. A company which 
purports to be expert in insurance matters and 
which purports to presents his clients 
interest cannot avoid the responsibility as 
thus incurred by arguing in hindsight that an 
insured cannot believe an insurance agent. 
(Citations omitted). 
What bad faith on the part of GEM STATE to not honor their own 
letter pre-authorizing 50 percent of all RON HORTONfs medical bills 
at the Pain Clinic and representations of their agent Mark 
Anderson. Addendum 1. 
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GEM STATE DID NOT ACT IN GOOD FAITH OR DEAL FAIRLY 
WITH RON HORTON 
Mr. HORTON contends that the Defendant GEM STATE did not act 
in good faith in not paying the Plaintiff's medical claims. 
At all times GEM STATE had the right to go to Peter Paul 
Prier and inspect the books and never did so. Transcript at 477, 
456, 262, 296# 354. The Defendant did not pay the claims of the 
Plaintiff from March 1986 until September 1986. Statement of Facts 
of Appellant #4 and #13. 
In Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 
1985) Utah Supreme Court said: 
The implied obligation of good faith perfor-
mance contemplates, at the very least that the 
insurer will diligently investigate the facts 
to enable to determine whether the claim is 
valid, will fairly evaluate the claim and 
will, therefore, at promptly and reasonably in 
rejecting or settling the claim (citations 
omitted) (Id. 800) . . . Deal with laymen as 
laymen and not as experts in the subtleties of 
law and underwriting" and to refrain from 
actions that will injure and that will enure 
to the insureds ability to obtain the benefits 
of the contract. (Citation omitted). These 
performances are the essence of what the 
insured has bargained and paid for, and the 
insurer has the obligation to perform them. 
When an insured has breached this duty he is 
liable for damages suffered in consequence of 
that breach. (Id. 801). (Emphasis added). 
RON HORTON contends that GEM STATE did not: 
1. Diligently investigate the facts; 
2. Fairly evaluate and consider the informa-
tion provided and did not act promptly 
and reasonably in either rejecting or 
settling the claim; 
3. Deal with the Plaintiff as a layman; 
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4. Have a set standard to judge RON HORTON's 
eligibility criteria. 
5. Stand by their pre-authorize procedure to 
the University Hospital and then declined 
to honor their own pre-authorization. 
In Callioux v. Progressive Insurance Co. , 745 P.2d 838 (CA 
Utah 1987) the court held that the insurance company was in good 
faith in denying the claims because of the results of their own 
investigation and an independent arson expert, and the State Fire 
Marshall all concluded the fire was caused from arson. One major 
difference in this case is that when the Plaintiff was acquitted 
from criminal charges of arson and insurance fraud the company 
immediately paid the full claim. In the case at hand, GEM STATE 
did not pay even after receiving Addendum A and Addendum B 
(letters from RON HORTON's employer). 
In Fletcher v. Western National Life Insurance Co., 89 Cal. 
Rptr. 78 (1970), the bad faith interpretation of medical reports 
concerning the insured's disability constituted the basic reason 
for the insurer's attempt to cancel benefits due the insured. 
In Silbera v. California Life Insurance Co., 113 Cal. Rptr. 
711 (1974) the court held that under the circumstances of the 
case, when the insurer interpreted the ambiguous provisions in the 
policy in its favor and against the insured's interest, it acted 
in bad faith as a matter of law. 
In this case the confusion and ambiguity was over the inter-
pretations of various officials of GEM STATE'S of what the 
criteria was they were looking for as to whether he was covered or 
not. Some of GEM STATES employees wanted to know was he working 
14 
1,000 hours per year (Transcript at 309,332-333, 273-277); or 
whether he was employed. Transcript at 456. 
In Williams v. First Colony Life Insurance Co., 593 P.2d 534 
(Utah 1979) this case stands, amongst other things, for the propo-
sition that the insurance carrier must act promptly and reasonably 
in settling the claim. It is contended in this case that taking 
seven (7) months to deny the claim is not prompt or reasonable. 
To that end, the Utah State Insurance Department has promul-
gated regulations entitled "The Unfair Claims Settlement Practice 
Regulations". See Addendum #6. 
One thing is clear, that the procedures followed by GEM 
STATE in this matter do not conform to the letter or spirit of 
these regulations. 
RON HORTON IS ENTITLED TO DAMAGES 
In FINDINGS OF FACT 17(b), the Court awarded $3,500 for 
medical expenses incurred after September 1, 1986, as a result of 
the Plaintiff's relapse after GEM STATE'S denial of coverage of 
RON HORTON. 
It could well be argued that the $5,000 consequential damages 
the Trial Court awarded are relatively low in light of problems 
created for RON HORTON as a result of GEM STATE'S bad faith. 
Clearly the damages were foreseeable. Stress is a major factor in 
pain rehabilitation. Transcript at 129-130. 
In addition to all of the above, GEM STATE knew Plaintiff was 
a professional music conductor and violinist that they undertook 
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to insure. Therefore, GEM STATE should have foreseen the 
emotional distress that might come upon a professional musician. 
Transcript 25-26, 33. 
FORESEEABILITY OF PAIN AND SUFFERING 
FROM WITHHOLDING MEDICAL PAYMENTS 
It is contended by the Plaintiff that it is foreseeable for 
a health insurance company that its actions of denial of coverage 
or timely delay of coverage could cause medical and psychological 
problems to flare up in their covered insured as a result of their 
actions. Surely, above all the insurance carriers' medical 
insurance carriers deals with people's health problems and there-
fore these consequences are foreseeable. Like a victim who has 
had a heart attack and had to go through the stress of not having 
future heart medical related services performed and then has 
another heart attack as a result of it, such would be foreseeable 
by the insurance carrier. That would be particularly so if there 
was a wrongful denial of coverage. 
This was borne out in Wilkins v. Grays Harbor Community 
Hospital. 427 P.2d 716 (Wash. 1967), wherein the Oregon Court 
said: 
We are of the opinion that increased pain and 
suffering and detrimental changes in one's 
health are certainly a reasonable foresee-
ability from a breach of this medical service 
contract by denying treatment under it. (Id. 
722) . . . 
We deem the evidence amply sufficient to 
justify a conclusion by the jury that the 
plaintiff had been permanently damaged as a 
16 
result of the defendant's breach of contract. 
Furthermore, we are of the opinion that the 
evidence with reference to damages is not 
speculative or conjectural. (Id. 724) 
Clearly, RON HORTON suffered a relapse and that relapse was 
attributable to the failure of GEM STATE to pay the Pain Clinic for 
his treatment. Transcript at 69, 78, 103-104. 
Both the $3,500 in medical expenses after the denial of 
coverage (Findings of Pact 17(b), paragraph #13 of GEM STATE1s 
Statement of Facts) and the $5,000 consequential damages (Findings 
of Fact 17(d)) are clearly a result of pain and suffering, incon-
venience and loss of work opportunity that were extensively 
testified to in trial without any rebuttal testimony being offered 
by GEM STATE. 
RON HORTON SEEKS ATTORNEY'S FEES FOR A BAD FAITH APPEAL 
This is a case involving an insurance company's failing to pay 
health insurance benefits of their insured. It is a bad faith 
case. 
If the Court were to read the Statement of Facts of the 
Appellant, and the Statement of Facts of the Respondent, the Court 
might reasonably conclude that they were not talking about the same 
case. It would appear that there is a duty on the appellant to 
fairly set out the facts of the case so the Court would not be 
mislead as to its factual basis. It would not appear that the 
Respondent has a duty to repeat everything the Appellant said about 
Appellant's case in the Statement of Facts, it would seem that the 
Appellant has a duty to set those facts with accuracy so a Court 
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can understand the precise nature of the conflict. (Rule 24 of the 
Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, Mountain States Broadcasting 
Co. v. Neale. 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989). 
If a trier of fact hears all the evidence and concludes that 
certain evidence is persuasive and the other evidence is not and 
thereafter so rules, then the trier of fact should not be found 
wanting. From the Respondent's Statement of Facts, there was ample 
evidence presented that would allow the trial court to make a 
determination in favor of RON HORTON and against GEM STATE. 
The Courts seem to have had difficulty in defining what is a 
"frivolous appeal11. See, O'Brien v. Rush, 744 P. 2d 306 (CA Utah 
1978). Canyon Country Store v. Bracev, 112 Utah Advanced Reports 
19 (1989). 
One issue is whether the Statement of Facts of GEM STATE 
mischaracterized and misstated the evidence presented by both 
parties at the trial. See, Eames v. Eames, 735 P.2d 395 (CA-Utah 
1987) . 
The Appellant asserts over and over in their brief that the 
"factual deficiencies in this litigation (of RON HORTON) allows 
them to have attorney's fees awarded to them pursuant to Rule 3 3(a) 
of the Rules of the Court of Appeals. Page 47 of Appellants 
Brief. This Court would have to read the Statement of Facts and 
make its own determination whether or not there were factual 
deficiencies in the transcript which would not justify the trial 
court acting as it did. 
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In O'Brien v. Rush, supra, the Courts will hear the issue of 
whether the appeal was taken frivolously or for delay. It should 
constitute common knowledge that to avoid payment of an insurance 
claim leaves the money in the bank of the insurance company 
accumulating interest and the medical providers of the insured 
going unpaid. 
Canyon Country Store v. Bracev. supra, tells us that by just 
showing breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing by 
an insured does not show the bad faith necessary for an award of 
attorney's fees under Section 78-27-56 of the Utah Code Ann. and 
that is not the claim in this case. Our claim is — the majority, 
if not all, of this appeal was taken frivolously. 
It is contended that for judicial economy and public policy 
the appellate court should not be required to go through "frivolous 
claims" to reach a valid claim. That issue was addressed in Morton 
v. Allied Stores Corp.. 90 F.R.D. 352 (D. Colo. 1981). That case 
was focusing on the Colorado statutory counterpart to the Utah Bad 
Faith Fee Statute. In that case, the Court held that court's may 
use their discretion when determining the amount of the attorney's 
fees to be awarded. In Morton, supra, the Colorado Federal 
District Court determined that one of two claims asserted was 
frivolous and therefore ordered an award of almost one-half of the 
attorney's fees incurred in the defense of the suit. If this 
approach were followed by the Utah courts, it would likely make the 
statute much more effective in saving the time of the court and 
counsel. Each party would be encouraged to realistically evaluate 
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the merit of each claim for appeal and to appeal only the valid 
claims or defenses. 
The attempts of the Appellant to argue that the law su-ports 
their rendition of the facts that were testified to in cor -, is 
clearly erroneous. Can an Appellant or Respondent simply r,-state 
the evidence in their case and ignore the evidence a their 
opponent's case and then appeal based on the fact that the Court 
did not accept their version of the facts. Paragraphs like: 
The only evidence Plaintiff put on at trial to 
rebut GEM's defense of failure to mitigate 
damages was his testimony that he did not 
understand the information GEM wanted 
(initially) and his employer was out of the 
country in June of 1986. Page 41 of the 
Appellant's Brief. 
This statement is clearly false and without merit and clearly 
flies in the face of the facts stated in the Respondent's Statement 
of Facts. We not only have issue of good faith and fair dealing, 
but we have the issue of pre-authorization which was never rebutted 
or denied as set forth in Addendum 1. Can GEM STATE giving pre-
authorization not pay the claim and make RON HORTON go through a 
trial and an appeal simply to get the original pre-authorization 
adhered to. Can an insurance company appeal a pre-authorization 
for medical services and at the same time admit that they made the 
pre-authorization? Transcript 3 68-381. 
AMBIGUITY IN GEM STATE'S POLICY OF INSURANCE 
It is a rule of contract law in general, and of insurance law 
in particular, that a written agreement should be construed against 
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the party who has drawn the instrument in the event that there is 
doubt as to its meaning. Sparks v. Republic National Life 
Insurance Co.. 647 P.2d 1127 (Ariz. 1982) , Silberg v. California 
Life Insurance, 113 Cal. Rptr. 711 (1974). It hardly would seem 
reasonable that an insurer could take advantage of an ambiguity in 
a policy to justify delay or refusal to make payment. In the 
Sparks case the Court states as follows: 
Defendants were fully aware if the grievous 
nature of Sparks' injuries and were further 
aware that plaintiffs would be faced with 
staggering medical bills upon termination of 
benefits. Nonetheless, defendants decided to 
deny any obligation to pay continuing benefits 
to plaintiffs based upon patently ambiguous 
and previously undisclosed provisions of the 
insurance policy. These facts, in conjunction 
with the trial court's determination that 
defendants had breached their contract with 
the plaintiffs, were sufficient to submit the 
issues of bad faith to the jury. 
The reason this helps an insurance company like GEM STATE and 
harms a small individual like RON HORTON, seeking the comfort of 
having health insurance, is simple. When GEM STATE saw the word 
"part-time" used in the GEM STATE'S Addendum 2, they used that 
ambiguous language to not make payments for seven (7) months and 
thereafter. 
The Plaintiff would therefore ask this Court to take judicial 
notice of, that the word "full-time" does not mean 1,000 hours. 
One thousand hours per year is "part-time". "Full-time" is 40 
hours per week, 52 weeks per year, which equal 2,080 hours. 
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THE COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED THE DOCUMENTS 
CONTAINED IN GEM STATE1S ADDENDUM 7 
RON HORTON sought all of the documents at GEM STATE pertaining 
to his case, GEM STATE'S effort to introduce documents in the 
middle of the trial that had never been produced in pre-trial 
discovery was properly denied by the Court. (R 120). 
First of all, the supplement to the responses of discovery 
were not complete as to the time they were made. Rule 26(e) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The documents in Appellant's 
Addendum 7 were in fact in existence at the offices of GEM STATE 
at the time the Request for Production of Documents was made, and 
they were not provided for inspection. (See pages 21-22 of GEM 
STATE'S Brief). Interestingly, this was also true of RON HORTON's 
Addendum 1 dealing with pre-authorization which was not provided 
under discovery. Fortunately Mr. HORTON found that copy or 
otherwise it likely never would have surfaced at trial. Transcript 
at 378. 
In this case, in the middle of a trial, after conflicting 
testimony by Mr. HORTON and GEM STATE as to whether Appellant's 
Addendum 7 had been sent or received, Appellant attempted to 
introduce it. Respondent is unable to locate a Utah case requiring 
the court to allow the introduction of documents, not forthcoming 
in discovery, in the midst of a trial. 
In any event, there is nothing contained in Exhibit 7 that 
would have changed the outcome of the Court's decision. It 
contains a notice to RON HORTON in April of 1986 saying we have 
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sent for more information from the hospital and two (2) form 
letters to the hospital seeking additional information from the 
Pain Clinic. Addendum 7 does not deal with the issue of pre-
authorization. The fact that these requests (Addendum 7 of GEM 
STATE*s Brief) were made in April of 1986, does not answer the 
question as to why it took GEM STATE until September to honor or 
dishonor their pre-authorization. Addendum 7 does not deal with 
GEM STATE'S failure to diligently investigate the facts as to 
whether RON HORTON was an employee or whether he was working 1,000 
hours depending on which GEM STATE employees were using whatever 
criteria at the time. 
In Tabat Chnick v. G.D. Searle & Co., 67 FRD 49 (D NJ 1975) 
the Court noted that supplemental answers under Rule 2 6 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, given after jury selection, are 
usually not timely. 
C O N C L U S I O N 
Wherefore, in light of the arguments and the facts set forth 
from the trial transcript and prevailing statutory and case law, 
RON HORTON respectfully requests this Court to sustain the lower 
Court's conclusions that GEM STATE pre-authorized the medical 
bills, breached its contract, and breached the covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing with RON HORTON. Further, RON HORTON asks 
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that the Court award the damages awarded by the trial court and RON 
HORTON's attorney's fees for defending this appeal. 
DATED THIS Q^^f day of November, 1989. 
JOHJKPRESTON CREER 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the Xi day of November, 1989, I 
caused four (4) true and correct copies of the REPLY BRIEF OF THE 
PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT RONALD M. HORTON to be hand delivered to the 
following: 
Jeffrey R. Oritt, Esq. 
TIBBALS, HOWELL, MOXLEY & WILKINS 
257 East 200 South, #850 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2048 
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ADDENDUM # 1 
GEM STATE MUTUAL OF UTAH 
376 East 400 South • Suite 309 • P.O. Box 449 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 • (801) 521-7164 
EXPLANATION OF BENEFITS CLAIM NUM3ER 263200 
HORTON, RONALD MEAD 
1325 COLONAIL CIRCLE 
SLC, UT 84108 
PATIENT 
SOCIAL SECURITY 
DATE PROCESSED 
PROCESSED BY 
HORTON, RONALD MEA 
529 58 1385 
04 APR 1986 
CWH 
CS1673 - PETER PAUL PRIER, INC. DBA 
C L A I M S U M M A R Y 
PROVIDER AND 
BENEFITS 
HARE, BRADFORD D 
MEDICAL VISITS 
MEDICAL VISITS 
SERVICE 
DATES 
12/30 
12/30 
SUBMITTED 
EXPENSES 
129. 00 
60. 00 
189. 00 
AMOUNTS DEDUCTIBLE 
ELIGIBLE AMOUNTS 
64. 50 
30. 00 
94. 50 
0. 00 
0. 00 
0. 00 
TOTAL 
PAID 
64. 50 
30. 00 
94. 50 
B E N E F I T D E T E R M I N A T I O N 
THIS IS AN ADJUSTMENT OF CLAIMS 249319 AND 258576 
'RGVIDER 
iARE, BRADFORD D 
P A Y M E N T S U M M A R Y 
PAYEE DRAFT 
RONALD MEAD HORTGN ?-. HAR 146394 
AMOUNT PAID 
94. 50 
94. 50 
I N E L I G I B L E C H A R G E S 
1 PAID AT 5Q%. PER PRE-AUTHORIZATION ALL CLAIMS PERTAINING 
?AIN CLINIC WILL BE PAID AT 507. 
2 SEE ITEM 1 
J THE 
ADDENDUM #2 
Peter Paul Prier, Inc. 
Luthier 
SPECIALIZING IN STRING INSTRUMENTS 
(Rare and Contemporary) 
Phone 364-3651 308 East 2nd South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
K/M 
To Whom It May Concern: 
Our payroll records show that Mr. Ronald M. Horton received a 
salary of $850.00 per month, from October 1, 1985 to the present. 
i^ eter j^ aul Prier 
Pres. 
^Tj*** (t", IM® 
£*> 
REr.Z't J i * V. 
MAYl ' ro. 
GFAA r-r. 
ADDENDUM #3 
Peter Paul jr ier , Inc. 
Lathi er 
SP-CAUZNG IN SKIING INSTRUMENTS 
(RaraandCantetnoorarvi 
2C3 Ssst 200 South 
Sait Lake ClY, Utah 3^111 
Jul ' / 17 , 1 2 3 6 
-^. j i fsx Services 
57a. 3ax 5299^
 a 4 i 0 6 
Salt. Laice C--< * U u 
. ^ . 1 ^ M*ad Hainan s—c_ 
* ~ n - * i s e arnDlavmenr or 
B C 5 S E ' » = 
^ 3 = - < ™ « — « " * ' l " 6 i ^ 
, .
 3 n r M f l - 3 estolaynent, « £ - a c ^ - " — « - i s c of 23% hours, Ronald H o r « a 3 » .
 f j ^ ^ c a c o n s i s t a 
^ v - Friday i a tS» Vio l in a * * * Sc-ool ^ ^ 
Monday - B—v-SiI „„T-snrsances: pr ivate <~ 
. „ ^ various areas and perroraan
 a r ^ a g e m e a c s , and se t -*S 
broKen in to var^ o r f f l a n C 3S, a a s i c arrang 
^ d a n c e and raaearsa ls , duo P 
^ d planning or r e c i t a l s -
Sincerely 
' | DEFENDANTS 
A «HjB»T 
AUG 0 51225 
• i r t - : 
li
'
c
"'' " ""EXHIBIT NO. 
ADDENDUM #4 
GEM STATE MUTUAL OF UTAH 
376 East 400 South • Suite 309 # P.O. Box 449 
Salt Lake City. Utah 34110 • (801)521-7164 
June 3, 1986 
Ronald Horton 
1325 Colonial Circle 
Salt Lake City, OT 34108 
Insured: Ronald Horton 
Patient: Ronald Horton 
Policy : CS1673 - Peter Prier, Inc. 
Dear Mr. Horton, 
As per our conversation on June 2, 1986, Pain Clinics are ineligible for 
benefits. Progress notes and records have been received and I have agreed 
to present them to the Review Committee. A few of the items that will be 
reviewed in reference to your claim are leave of absence, education, stress 
management, sleep management, health behavior, pain control, psychotherapy, 
aroebics, drugs de-toxic, etc. Upon corrpletion of the review we will notify 
you of the final decision made by the Review Cdnmittee. 
It was a pleasure speaking with you and if you have any further questions, 
please do not hesitate to contact me. 
^ 
Sincerely, 
Shirley^Sunderland 
Claims Manager 
SS/tj 
ADDENDUM #5 
MAR - 6 1989 
^ALT UKE COUNTY 
Oeputy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RONALD M. HORTON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GEM STATE MUTUAL OF UTAH 
Defendant• 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
CIVIL NO. 870902090 
The above entitled matter came on for a non-jury trial, 
Honorable Frank G. Noel presiding, on December 6, 7, and 12, 1988. 
Plaintiff was represented by John Preston Creer and defendant, Gem 
State Mutual of Utah ("Gem State") was represented by Jeffrey R. 
Oritt. The Court having heard and considered the evidence and the 
arguments of counsel hereby makes and enters its Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law as follows: 
1. In December, 1983, Ron Horton suffered injuries from an 
automobile accident. 
2. Ron Horton was employed by Peter Paul Prier as of 
September, 1984. 
3. Peter Paul Prier obtained group health and life 
insurance from Gem State through Inter-Mountain Employers Trust, 
effective November 1, 1984. On February 16, 1986, Ron Horton 
entered the University of Utah Medical Center Pain Clinic. He 
concluded his in-patient stay at the Pain Clinic on March 16, 
1986. His medical bills for his stay at the University of Utah 
Medical Center Pain Clinic totaled $13,633.60. The portion of that 
amount to which he was entitled for medical expenses under Gem 
State's policy of insurance totaled $8,254.80. 
4. On March 31, 1988, Gem State received the billings from 
the University of Utah Pain Clinic for the plaintiff. 
5. Gem State sent plaintiff an explanation of benefits 
sheet dated April 4, 1986, which noted that the medical expenses 
set forth thereon where "paid at 50% for pre-authorization. All 
claims pertaining to Pain Clinic will be paid at 50%." 
6. On or about June 3, 1986, Gem State wrote to plaintiff, 
noting that Pain Clinic expenses were not covered under his group 
health insurance policy. 
7. On May 12, 1986, Gem State wrote Peter Paul Prier 
seeking information verifying that Ron Horton was employed by Peter 
Paul Prier. 
8. On May 14, 1986, Peter Paul Prier wrote to Gem State 
advising Gem State that Ron Horton was employed and was on a 
monthly salary. 
9. On July 17, 1986, Peter Paul Prier wrote a second letter 
to Gem State confirming Ron Hortons full time employment, 
specifically identifying the number of hours per week he worked and 
explaining the nature of plaintiff's employment responsibilities 
from September 19, 1985 through May, 1986. 
10. On August 15, 1986, Gem State wrote a second letter to 
Peter Paul Prier requesting additional information including 
payroll records. 
11. There is no evidence that anyone representing Gem State 
ever requested an on-site inspection of Peter Paul Prier7s payroll 
records, at Peter Paul Priers business establishment. 
12. On September 29, 1986, Gem State canceled Ron Horton's 
policy refusing to make payment on any medical expenses incurred by 
Mr. Horton. 
13. The Court finds based on the testimony of Gem States own 
witnesses that the only issue addressed by them in their 
investigation from May 2, 1986 to September 29f 1986, when the 
policy was canceled was whether or not Ron Horton was employed by 
Peter Paul Prier. 
14. The Court finds that Gem States cancellation of Mr. 
Horton's coverage contributed to a relapse in his condition causing 
additional medical expenses and other consequential damages 
including the necessity of hiring an attorney to litigate his 
rights under the policy. 
15. The Court finds that the defendant did not act 
reasonably to adequately investigate and to promptly process and 
pay the plaintiff's claims. 
16. The Court finds that the defendant breached its implied 
contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing with the 
plaintiff. The Court finds that defendant's failure to pay the 
insurance proceeds to the plaintiff prior to September of 1986, was 
a breach of the express terms of plaintiff's contract with the 
defendant. 
17. Plaintiff, VM.S damage-i by defendant's breaches as follows: 
a. 8,254 for nodical expenses covered under the. 
po.Ucy v>r.ior to the date of cancellation of 
Frier's Group Health Insurance Policy on 
September lf 1986. 
b. $3,500 for medical expenses incurred after 
September 1, 1986 as a result of plaintiff's 
relapse after defendant's denial of coverage, 
c. Attorney's fees in the amount of $15,000. 
d. Other consequential damages in the amount of 
$5,000. 
e. Plaintiffs has incurred taxable cost in this 
litigation in the amount of 
f. The Court finds no basis for defendants 
counterclaim for attorney's fees. 
The Court having entered it's Findings of Fact now makes and 
enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court has jurisdiction over this matter. 
2. Venue was properly laid in this forum. 
3. Defendant's failure to pay health insurance benefits to 
the plaintiff for medical expenses incurred between February 16, 
1986 and August 31, 1986, was a breach of defendant's contract with 
the plaintiff. 
4. Defendant breached its implied contractual covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing with the plaintiff by failing to 
adequately investigate and to properly process and pay plaintiff's 
claims. 
5. Plaintiff is entitled to an award of damages in the 
amount set forth in it's Findings of Fact. 
6. Plaintiff is awarded his costs as follows: 
1. Dr. John Heil, Witness fee $750.00 
2. Dr. John Heil, Air Fare 996.00 
3. Filing fee 75.00 
4. Jury Demand 50.00 
5. Service of Process 9.80 
TOTAL $1,880.80 
7. Attorney's fees in the amount of $15,000. 
8. Defendant's counterclaim for attorney's fees should be 
dismissed. . I 
Dated this (SJ day of cEetertraxy, 1989. 
^Lc 
Frank G. Noel 
District Court Judge 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, postage 
prepaid, to the following, this day of February, 1989: 
John Preston Creer 
Jack L. Schoenhals 
1200 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Jeffrey R. Oritt 
TIBBALS, HOWELL, MOXLEY & WILKINS 
Two Fifty Seven Towers, Suite 850 
257 East 200 South - 2 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
ADDENDUM #6 
Utah State Insurance Department's "THE UNFAIR CLAIMS SETTLE-
MENT PRACTICE REGULATIONS": 
The purpose of this regulation is to respond 
to the volume of complaints arising from 
claims settlement practices by affirmatively 
establishing standards of equity and good 
faith to guide licensees in the settlement of 
claims. (Emphasis added) . . . 
E. Failing to affirm or deny coverage of 
claims within a reasonable time after proof of 
loss statements have been completed and com-
municated to the company or its represent-
ative; (Emphasis added). 
F. Not attempting in good faith to effectuate 
prompt, fair and equitable settlements of 
claims in which liability has become 
reasonably clear; (Emphasis added). 
G. Compelling insureds to institute litiga-
tion to recover amounts due under an insurance 
policy by offering substantially less than the 
amounts ultimately recovered in actions 
brought by such insureds when claims or 
demands have been made for amounts reasonably 
similar to the amounts ultimately recovered; 
(Emphasis added) . . . 
N. Failing to promptly provide a reasonable 
explanation of the basis, in the insurance 
policy, the facts or the applicable law, for 
denial of a claim or for the offer of a com-
promise settlement; (Emphasis added) . . . 
Every insurer shall complete investigation of 
a claim within forty-five (45) days after 
notification of claim, unless such investiga-
tion cannot reasonably be completed within 
such time. (R540-89-9) (Emphasis added). 
